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Abstract
In Under Western Eyes, Joseph Conrad (1911/1989) writes that “women, children, and 
revolutionists hate irony, which is the negation of all saving instincts, of all faith, of 
all devotion, of all actions.” Here a connection between “women,” “children,” and 
“revolutionists” is asserted on the grounds of a shared attitude to language; but what 
is the nature or cause of this presumed antipathy to irony? I argue that the answers 
to this question have to do with what irony as a mode implies about language on 
the one hand, and with what the investments of “revolutionists” are in the categories 
of “women” and “children” on the other. These three identities are constructed in 
Conrad’s formulation as literal-minded, demanding a language that straightforwardly 
means what it says, and yet irony necessarily disrupts and undermines such notions 
of a literal language with a direct and unmediated relationship to the real world. 
Furthermore, as Jacqueline Rose (1984/1992) has argued, this Conradian stance can 
be found operating in the same way in relation to ideas of childhood and irony in 
children’s literature criticism. That such a stance is not inevitable for either feminism 
or children’s literature criticism will be argued by looking at parallels between 
feminist/queer theory and the approach to children’s literature criticism of the 
“Graduate Centre for International Research in Childhood: Literature, Culture, Media 
(CIRCL),” at the University of Reading, England.
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Introduction
In her 1994 book, Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony, Linda 
Hutcheon quotes from Joseph Conrad’s (1911/1989) Under Western Eyes, as 
follows: “[...] women, children, and revolutionists hate irony, which is the 
* With special thanks to Sarah Spooner.
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negation of all saving instincts, of all faith, of all devotion, of all action” 
(p. 270).1 This quotation offers a useful way of opening up to exploration 
the relationship between gender, children’s literature, the political im-
plications of children’s literature criticism and what irony can reveal about 
the connections between these areas.
Why consider irony in particular? What does irony have to do with gen-
der, or perhaps even more surprisingly, children’s literature? To take the 
second of these two questions first, it is worth noting that the practice of 
children’s literature criticism has been, and continues to be, dominated by 
thematic readings that focus on an idea of “content” at the expense of 
form.2 Where form is engaged with it is largely limited, as with the recent 
call for papers in Children’s Literature Association Quarterly, to a consideration 
of genre3 as opposed to a more all-encompassing attention to “language it-
self” (Hunt, 1991, p. 102)4 and its vicissitudes. As I have argued elsewhere 
(Walsh, 2003), thematic studies tend to imply a particular conception of 
language as having a representational relationship to a presupposed “reality” 
which, as June Howard argues in another context, is never itself 
“acknowledged as a text but taken for granted as [...] natural” (Howard, 1985, 
p. 14). Where gender enters the scene of children’s literature criticism it 
tends to be femininity – or, less frequently, masculinity – as an ontologically 
unquestionable theme, which is to say that particular kinds of femininity or 
1 In fact Hutcheon offers a slightly different version of the quotation, referring to “revolutionaries” 
rather than to “revolutionists” (Hutcheon, 1994, p. ix).
2 As originally argued by Rose in 1984; and with respect to my founding argument on the relation 
of “irony” to children’s literature criticism see Walsh, 2003. This remains the case, as argued 
by Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (2016a, 2016b) both in her forthcoming article for BREAC entitled 
“Children’s Literature: Sexual Identity, Gender and Childhood” and also in her introductory ar-
ticle for this issue of Asian Women, entitled “Gender, Childhood and Children’s Literature: the 
CIRCL Approach.” For this argument with respect to literary criticism more widely, see Neil 
Cocks’ introduction to his recent The Peripheral Child in Nineteenth-Century Literature and its Criticism 
(Cocks, 2014).
3 See the recent call for papers for a special issue of the Children’s Literature Association Quarterly 
on “Genre and Black Literature” (closing date November 1st, 2015), which specifies the follow-
ing possibilities: speculative fiction, regional writing, historical fiction, adaptations, picture books, 
films, cartoons, comics, graphic novels and poetry.
4 In 1991, Peter Hunt placed his noting of a “neglect of language itself” in children’s literature 
criticism in the context of “the emphasis placed on the use of children’s literature [which] has 
led to concentration on affect, which has led in turn to some very simplistic models of the 
reading process, and concentration on thematic analysis” (Hunt, 1991, p. 102).
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masculinity may be subjected to question, but the actuality of sexual differ-
ence is not. This is the case with, for example, the following: Kathryn 
Strong Hansen’s recent Children’s Literature Association Quarterly article on dif-
ferent “potential paths of femininity” in Suzanne Collins’s Hunger Games 
trilogy (Hansen, 2015, p. 161), Laura Hakala’s piece for Children’s Literature 
on limiting notions of girlhood in literature of the American South during 
the American civil war (Hakala, 2015), or Dawn Heinecken’s essay for The 
Lion and the Unicorn critiquing the claims of young adult sports fiction series 
to be “empowering girls” (Heinecken, 2015, p. 24). What these three ar-
ticles have in common, notwithstanding their progressivist credentials, is a 
focus on the construction of femininity that only goes so far. Drawing on 
feminist and queer theorists Shoshana Felman (1982), Denise Riley (1988, 
2000), Donna Haraway (1991), and Judith Butler (1997, 1990/2006), I 
would argue that this kind of critique is, in the end, limited, and can be 
challenged and developed upon by an engagement with the radical destabi-
lizing possibilities of irony.
However, when considering not only gender but also childhood under 
the sign of irony, we must concede that competence in grasping irony is 
generally regarded as one marker (among others) that distinguishes adults 
from children. According to developmental psychologist Ellen Winner, 
“adults do not ordinarily misunderstand metaphor and irony” whereas by 
implication, children do (Winner, 1997, p. 54);5 and as far as the literary 
theorist Kenneth Burke is concerned, a person’s ability to understand and 
use irony “spontaneously” is what confirms them as “mature” language 
users (Burke, 1966, p. 12). But why should this be the case, and what are 
the further implications?
Irony and the Language of the Child
Irony, conventionally defined as saying the opposite of what is meant, 
is contingent on the possibility that there is no natural and inevitable relation-
ship between the word and what it refers to, and requires a notion of language 
that allows that it does not necessarily mean what it says; whereas the child 
and its language tend to be seen as simply meaning what they say. Children 
5 For a fuller discussion of Ellen Winner’s study of children’s understanding of metaphor and 
irony, see Walsh, S. (2011).
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are just not supposed to “get” irony, since irony challenges the notion that 
language has a direct and unmediated relationship to the “real” world, and 
this notion of language is one that is, as Jacqueline Rose argues in The Case 
of Peter Pan, intimately connected with conceptions of the child:
Both Locke and Rousseau [...] recognize, in different ways, that 
there is no natural relation between the linguistic sign and the 
thing to which it refers. But they wish to by-pass this aspect of 
language through the child. Language is imperfect (Locke) or 
degenerate (Rousseau), which implies the possibility of some 
perfect, or original and uncontaminated form of expression. [...] In 
Emile, therefore, the child is being asked not only to retrieve a lost 
state of nature, but also to take language back to its pure and 
uncontaminated source in the objects of the immediate world. 
(Rose, 1984/1992, p. 47)
According to Rose, the investment in the notion of a directly perceivable 
and reproducible “real” world is observable in children’s literature and its 
criticism, and is rooted in a desire to redeem language from its inevitable 
arbitrariness and conventionality. The ironic possibility of speaking or sign-
ing the opposite of what is meant is felt as a threat or corruption and is 
foreclosed through the figure of the child for whom language must be en-
visaged as a perfect form of communication not subject to the vagaries im-
plied by interpretability. Thus the child is configured as an identity anterior 
to the discourses through which it finds its existence as such.
Irony: Questioning the Category of Childhood
If irony is often discussed as something that precludes, or can be ex-
pected to preclude, the child (see for e.g. Kümmerling-Meibauer, 1999; 
Recchia, Howe, Ross & Alexander, 2010,6 Stott, 1982; Wall, 19917), it is 
6 Holly E. Recchia, Nina Howe, Hildy S. Ross, and Stephanie Alexander observe in their 2010 
study of children’s understanding and use of irony in family conversations that “Previous re-
search on children’s understanding of ironic language reveals that it is a relatively late-developing 
skill” (p. 256).
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interesting to note that many texts that are considered to be classics of 
children’s literature may nevertheless lay claim to being works that deploy 
irony quite liberally; a few examples might include J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan, 
the complete oeuvre of Beatrix Potter, and Astrid Lindgren’s Pippi 
Longstocking. One of English children’s literature’s most accomplished and 
insistent ironists, E. Nesbit, offers the following definition of irony in The 
Story of the Amulet (Nesbit, 1906/1975):
The children took this to be bitter irony, which means saying the 
exact opposite of what you mean in order to make yourself 
disagreeable; as when you happen to have a dirty face, and 
someone says, “How nice and clean you look!” (Nesbit, 1906/1975, 
p. 87).
Interestingly, the words that the children in this text take to be irony – 
“What’s gone wrong? You’ve soon tired of your picnic” (Nesbit, 1906/1975, 
p. 87) – are not intended as such by the “old Nurse” who is genuinely 
surprised that they have returned home so soon after setting off on a day 
out. The children, on the other hand, think that the adventure they have 
just had, courtesy of the titular amulet, means that they must have been 
away for a whole day because “The sun looks about the same as it did 
when we started yesterday” (Nesbit, 1906/1975, p. 87). Old Nurse’s under-
standing of things, however, is soon explained by the Psammead – a 
“sand-fairy” (Nesbit, 1906/1975, p. 11) – who tells the children that “You 
come back through the charm-arch at the same time as you go through 
it. This isn’t tomorrow!” (Nesbit, 1906/1975, p. 88).
The children’s attribution or misattribution of irony points to a funda-
mental question about irony, which is: “where can it be said to reside?” 
Is it to be found in the intentions of the author/speaker, or in the per-
spective of the reader/listener? But this question is not a question for irony 
alone, it is a question that pertains to all and any meaning; it is simply that 
7 Discussing whether Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn can properly be considered a 
children’s book, Wall argues that “My own experience as a child, a teacher, a reader and a re-
searcher suggests that the language and the ironies of Huckleberry Finn are bewildering to chil-
dren, and in many cases to adolescents too” (Wall, 1991, p. 116).
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the instance of irony reveals a problem with any notion of language as 
straightforwardly clear, transparent, and hitting its mark without fail. In 
short it reveals as a problem any easy division of language into the “literal” 
and the “figurative.”
However, in The Story of the Amulet, notwithstanding the question raised 
by the children’s identification of irony where none was intended, irony is 
still constituted in terms of the intentions of the speaker, because the irony 
– “saying the exact opposite of what you mean” – is understood to have 
a purpose, which is “to make yourself disagreeable.” This is an interesting 
(and ironic?) claim in a text in which irony is deployed so liberally as, ac-
cording to its own claims, to make itself very disagreeable indeed!8 
Moreover, irony is characterized here as indicating a self with a difference 
in view, a self with a quarrel to initiate, a self at odds with another or oth-
ers (which might include its very self), for there is an object or other to 
whom the self is making itself disagreeable. Irony then is an index of divi-
sion: in language, amongst selves, and/or within the self.
It is also worth noting that in this extract from The Story of the Amulet 
it is children who perceive irony (even if mistakenly), and perceive it to be 
directed at them by old Nurse, an adult figure of authority. The irony in 
such a case is characterized as “bitter” but this implies that perhaps not 
all forms of irony are equally bitter and that maybe it is only “bitter irony” 
which is motivated by the desire “to make yourself disagreeable.” Set in 
relation to this, the example of irony that is offered is illuminating. In the 
first place the disagreeableness of irony here seems to be about the indirect 
policing of children’s appearance and behavior. If read as an analogy that 
accounts for the children’s assumption that old Nurse’s reaction to them 
was ironic, this policing can be understood as being undertaken by an 
adult.9 However, this reading can be called into question in two ways: first-
ly, according to the text, old Nurse is not being ironic and the children 
have fallen into an error in assuming she is; thus irony here does not origi-
nate with the adult but with the children. Secondly, the narration here 
8 Indeed, allied to this is the rather marked similarity, throughout the text, between the narrator 
and the Psammead.
9 “Could it be that old Nurse had so changed that she no longer cared that they should have 
been away from home for twenty-four hours—all night in fact—without any explanation what-
ever?” (Nesbit, 1906/1975, p. 88).
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means that it is difficult to keep “adult” and “child” securely separate from 
each other since what the children “took” the old Nurse’s words to be is 
conveyed from a narratorial perspective that does not exactly share their 
position and yet is not clearly differentiated from them either. The role of 
the ironist, though assumed by the children to be taken on by an adult, 
is not reserved to adulthood within the narration since it both exonerates 
old Nurse as responding to what seems to her to be the children’s sudden 
re-appearance with genuine “amazement,” and explains “bitter irony” as 
“saying [...] the opposite of what you mean in order to make yourself dis-
agreeable” (Nesbit, 1906/1975, p. 87, emphases added). The “you,” con-
structed as one who does not know what irony is, might be assumed to 
be a child rather than an adult, given that according to the children’s belief 
it is adults who deploy irony, not children; but the ignorant “you” is nei-
ther securely adult nor child in this formulation, since in this text it is the 
“children” that do know what irony is, even if they misattribute it, and the 
adult here is neither aware of the possibility of irony nor a wielder of it. 
Once again the example is illuminating in that the second person pronoun 
shifts from being the employer of irony to being the object of it, and thus 
the question of the location and originating point of irony resurfaces, for 
the ironist becomes a nameless and indeterminate “someone” marked only 
by either an attempt to instill a certain propriety in the “you” who 
“happen[s] to have a dirty face,” or conversely may be read as making an 
attempt (a quarrelsome or disagreeable attempt perhaps, depending on 
one’s point of view) to redefine that very notion of propriety; which of 
these options it will be depends on the reading of the narrative perspective.
Connected to the question of the location of irony is an issue that 
Jonathan Arac quotes Shelley Fisher Fishkin as drawing attention to in rela-
tion to Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884), and that is that “An ironist 
‘faces two problems,’ namely, that the ‘reader may miss the point’ and that 
‘the reader may get the wrong point’” (Arac, 1997, p. 14). Indeed, the ques-
tion, as Arac goes on to suggest, becomes one of how to argue what the 
point is and fundamentally hinges on a question of authority – which is 
to say, who is it that has the authority to say what exactly “the” point is? 
Because if irony is understood as saying the opposite of what is meant, it 
cannot in a certain sense avoid saying both what it supposedly does not 
“really” mean as well as what it supposedly does. Thus the question then 
becomes: on what grounds might one privilege a particular reading, that is 
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to say the reading of the “meant”?
Ironizing Irony in Joseph Conrad’s Under Western Eyes
What then of the opening quotation from Conrad which states that “[...] 
women, children, and revolutionists hate irony, which is the negation of all 
saving instincts, of all faith, of all devotion, of all action” (Conrad, 
1911/1989, p. 270)? What is the connection between “women, children, 
and revolutionists” and what is the nature or cause of their presumed an-
tipathy to irony? As Denise Riley notes in The Words of Selves, as far as po-
litical and ethical engagement goes, on the whole irony has a 
“spasmodically poor reputation” (Riley, 2000, p. 14), and “still periodically 
attracts charges of being evasive” (Riley, 2000, p. 163), and the quotation 
from Under Western Eyes would seem to fit into such a mold.
In this extract irony is configured as undermining the certitudes on 
which “faith” and “devotion” must rest, and thereby as stripping “all ac-
tion” of its raison d’être. Interestingly, irony is implicitly constituted as mas-
culine, adult, and rational in its opposition to the feminized and infantilized 
irrationality of “instinct,” “faith,” and “devotion”; thus action is also there-
by constituted as having its foundation in what is constituted as childish 
irrationality. Irony, it seems, becomes a masculine counsel of abstention, 
hence the charge of “negation”: for irony here appears to deny the possi-
bility of change.
But who is it that speaks here? This quotation is, in Under Western Eyes, 
narrated as part of a dialogue between a female revolutionist, Sophia 
Antonovna, and a male seeming-revolutionist, Kirylo Sidorovitch Razumov, 
who is in the confidence of the revolutionists but working as a spy for the 
Tsarist Russian government. It is the female die-hard revolutionist, Sophia 
Antonovna, who makes the claim about irony and the hostility of 
“women,” “children,” and “revolutionists” to it:
“Well, Sophia Antonovna,” his air of reluctant concession was 
genuine in so far that he was really loath to part with her without 
testing her sincerity by a question it was impossible to bring about 
in any way; “well, Sophia Antonovna, if that is so, then ‒”
“The creature has done justice to himself,” the woman observed, 
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as if thinking aloud.
“What? Ah yes! Remorse,” Razumov muttered with equivocal 
contempt.
“Don’t be harsh, Kirylo Sidorovitch, if you have lost a friend.” 
There was no hint of softness in her tone, only the black glitter 
of her eyes seemed detached for an instant from vengeful visions. 
“He was a man of the people. The simple Russian soul is never 
wholly impenitent. It’s something to know that.”
“Consoling?” insinuated Razumov, in a tone of inquiry.
“Leave off railing,” she checked him explosively. “Remember, 
Razumov, that women, children, and revolutionists hate irony, 
which is the negation of all saving instincts, of all faith, of all 
devotion, of all action. Don’t rail! Leave off [...] I don’t know how 
it is, but there are moments when you are abhorrent to me [...]” 
(Conrad, 1911/1989, p. 270)
In this unfolding exchange, there is a repeated narrative of contrast be-
tween exteriorities and interiorities, of the apparent meaning of speech acts 
set against a questioning of the “air” or “tone” in which they are expressed. 
Razumov’s interiority is stated from the outset to match his exterior ex-
pressions only to a certain and limited extent thereby suggesting that it is 
more usual for Razumov’s speech acts to be completely at odds with his 
self. In short, as a spy, what Razumov says is habitually and necessarily the 
opposite of what he means. Thus, Razumov would appear to be the repre-
sentative ironist in this scene, and through him irony might be understood 
to be constituted as unethical in this text; for, while he is concerned to 
“test” the “sincerity” of the woman, Razumov himself is busy dissembling.
Razumov, however, does not have a monopoly on seeming, for the ap-
parently unequivocal revolutionist Sophia Antonovna is no more trans-
parent to him than he is to her. Antonovna finishes Razumov’s sentence 
“as if thinking aloud” (emphasis added), the implication being that this un-
guarded thinking in Razumov’s presence might be as truly spontaneous as 
“his air of reluctant concession was genuine.” Moreover, Antonovna’s tone 
does not match the meaning of her words, for while she appeals to 
Razumov not to be “harsh,” her tone has nothing of the “softness” that 
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such a sentiment might imply. It is “only the black glitter of her eyes” that 
appears to equate to her words, and only insofar as they “seemed detached 
for an instant from vengeful visions” (emphases added). There is thus a dif-
ference between Antonovna and Razumov in that while it is implied that 
there may be as much a disjuncture in how she appears as there is in how 
he appears, that disjuncture may also be read as an effect of a difference 
in perspective. In other words, the disjuncture between Antonovna’s “tone” 
and the momentary look of the eyes is entirely at the level of how she seems 
to him, and it is no accident that what can be observed here, in this elabo-
ration on irony, is a known man looking at an unknown and ultimately un-
seen woman, unknowable because she is unknown and unseen to him. 
Nevertheless, at least one thing that is known about Razumov is also some-
what uncertain, which is his contempt that is “equivocal,” and yet this too 
is a doubleness which returns Razumov to the authenticity of his 
inauthenticity.
Razumov’s desire to “test” Sophia Antonovna’s “sincerity” indicates a 
concern, despite his own dissembling, to figure out whether she is holding 
anything back in their exchange, such as, for example, an incipient knowl-
edge of his double-dealing. In other words, ironically enough, Razumov is 
engaged in a quest to determine whether Antonovna’s appearance (of being 
completely undivided within herself) matches the reality, but what becomes 
apparent here is that this reality is, and can only ever be, reality as it seems 
to be to him. In the interplay between the two characters, whereas 
Razumov may be read as continually engaged in a performance (“his air 
of” and “insinuated [...] in a tone of”), any limited element that would sug-
gest the same of Antonovna – the seeming detachment of her eyes from 
“vengeful visions,” for example – is an effect of Razumov’s perception of 
her. For Antonovna, on the other hand, it would appear that “the simple 
Russian soul” represented by Ziemianitch is an essential, singular identity. 
This singular soul however, is not undivided, because it is a self that is 
“never wholly impenitent” and therefore never wholly one thing. This be-
comes evident just before the text’s only direct claim about irony, which 
is Antonovna’s response to Razumov’s question which she takes as ob-
liquely conveying derision about the possibility of finding consolation in a 
betrayer’s remorse. Thus, while the supposedly single-minded female revo-
lutionist is able to respond to the penitence of Ziemianitch who she be-
lieves to be the betrayer (the “man of the people” who is therefore charac-
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teristically “double” to her), Razumov, himself a double-agent, is not. Of 
course, it might be said that this is because he, necessarily saying the oppo-
site of what he means or feels by virtue of his position as a spy, knows 
both that there was no need for Ziemianitch to feel remorse since he was 
not the informant and that it is he himself who is the betrayer.
Antonovna’s acceptance of, and ability to find consolation in, the double-
ness of “the simple Russian soul” cuts across the apparent inability to 
brook ambivalence demonstrated in her injunction on Razumov to 
“remember,” which can be read as a call to him to cohere himself to the 
properly undivided identity of the revolutionist. This is a further irony giv-
en Antonovna’s understanding of the “man of the people” as not, after all, 
“simply” one. Antonovna’s call on Razumov to “remember” indicates, that 
as far as she is concerned, Razumov already knows what she is referring 
to, and “remember” thus also indicates an identity – that of the 
“revolutionist” – that is already in circulation and that he is expected to 
recognize. She reads Razumov’s failure to conform to this identity in what 
she believes to be his use of irony, which she regards as potentially under-
mining their revolutionary position because it constitutes ambivalence to 
the cause. However, a yet further irony is that Antonovna herself is not 
conforming to the unitariness of that revolutionist identity either, precisely 
because she can find consolation in the doubleness of the “simple Russian 
soul,” and moreover, when she appeals to Razumov not to be “harsh” she 
is asking him, in her own terms, to be untrue to himself. Finally, the very 
injunction to “remember” constitutes an acknowledgment on Antonovna’s 
part of the inessential nature of the “revolutionist” identity she is calling 
on Razumov to inhabit since it is an identity that has to be performed and 
is therefore not the uninhibited “truth” of either Razumov or herself.
As for the relationship of “women, children, and revolutionists” to irony 
– whilst each identity is implicitly set up in relation to the adult, male an-
ti-revolutionist as essential, inviolable categories, the very fact of their rec-
ognition of irony already constitutes a corrosion of the innocence upon 
which the categories rely. This is the case because “women, children, and 
revolutionists” could not “hate irony” without seeing or recognizing it, and 
in order to see irony the gap between what is said and what is meant is 
affirmed as present.
Both Nesbit and Conrad produce figures supposedly inherently hostile to 
irony – the child, the woman, the revolutionist – and yet both texts ironize 
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that supposed antipathy, and in doing so challenge the category distinctions 
of “child” and “adult,” “women” and “man,” “revolutionist” and non- or 
anti-revolutionist. It is a certain kind of knowledge that threatens the dis-
tinction of categories: in the Nesbit, the children misattribute irony but 
“know” what it is, and this in itself reveals the irony of their misattribution; 
in the Conrad, children, women and revolutionists hate irony, and in doing 
so implicitly reveal their “knowledge” of it, which interrogates any claim 
to a unitary identity, protected from the divisions inherent to irony.
Irony’s Challenge to the Empirical World
Jacqueline Rose’s analysis of the construction of the child as predis-
cursive prefigures and parallels Judith Butler’s (1990/2006) critique in 
Gender Trouble of even feminist categorical distinctions between sex and gen-
der, where gender is defined as the cultural interpretation of an immutable 
reality:
[I]f the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this 
construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender; 
indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the 
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out 
to be no distinction at all. [...] As a result, gender is not to culture 
as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by 
which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and 
established as “prediscursive,” prior to culture, a politically neutral 
surface on which culture acts. This [is a] construction of “sex” as 
the radically unconstructed [...] (Butler, 1990/2006, pp. 9‒10).
This kind of critique of the investment in prediscursive identities and 
challenge to category distinctions is what I have also read above as implicit 
in the figure of irony. For, as Paul de Man argues, tropes like irony should 
not be “understood semantically as a figurative meaning that derives from 
literal, proper denomination,”
Rather the reverse is the case. The trope is not a derived, 
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marginal, or aberrant form of language but the linguistic paradigm 
par excellence. The figurative structure is not one linguistic mode 
among others but it characterizes language as such (de Man, 1979, 
p. 105).
Furthermore, since Paul de Man argues that irony “transfers the self out 
of the empirical world into a world constituted out of and in language” 
(de Man, 1971/1983, p. 213), one reason we could argue that 
“revolutionists” should hate irony is precisely because of their supposed in-
vestment in a cohered and universal subject identity that is anterior to dis-
course, which is to be represented and/or fought for, the kind of identity 
that Sophia Antonovna calls upon Razumov to “remember.” As Rose ar-
gues, “children” habitually fulfill this stabilizing role and, as Butler argues, 
“women” not only fulfill it in the discourses against which feminism is 
aimed, but can also end up doing so within the very politics intended to 
liberate them from these identifications (Butler, 1990/2006, pp. 4‒8).
Implications for the Criticism of Children’s Literature
What then are the consequences, for children’s literature criticism, of fol-
lowing through Butler’s argument that “[t]here is no gender identity behind 
the expressions of gender” (Butler, 1990/2006, p. 34); or Rose’s argument 
that “[t]here is no child behind the category of ‘children’s fiction’, other 
than the one which the category itself sets in place, the one which it needs 
to believe is there for its own purposes” (Rose, 1984/1992, p. 10)? In oth-
er words, what are the consequences of reading identity as constructed by 
and within discourse, and not as anterior to it? Such work, exemplified by 
the University of Reading’s “Graduate Centre for International Research in 
Childhood: Literature, Culture, Media (CIRCL),” is expressly concerned 
with not reifying a notion of the “real” child or “real” woman. In taking 
this position such criticism cannot then logically go on to make pronounce-
ments about how children will read or respond to texts. As Butler notes, 
“there is very little agreement [...] on what it is that constitutes or ought 
to constitute, the category of women” (Butler, 1990/2006, p. 2) and in the 
end this is the case too with “children,” for, despite all protestations to the 
contrary, children’s literature critics do not agree on the definition of 
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childhood.10
Following from this, if any particular narrative about childhood (or for 
that matter any other identity) were to be privileged as the real and correct 
one, this would be a reification of a construction given a spurious authority 
detracting from the question of whose interests are served by such a 
construction. The questions to be posed to any such construction are: 
“Who is talking and to whom?” (Rose, 1984/1992, p. 12); and “who is see-
ing whom and from where?” (Riley, 2000, p. 9) – these are the questions 
implicitly prompted in an ironic reading.
To read identity as always already constructed can be argued by 
“revolutionists” to weaken their political cause, for on what basis can a rep-
resentational politics operate if the identity it seeks to represent cannot be 
defended as “authentic,” or as the “right,” the “true,” and the “real” one? 
This might be understood to be what is meant by irony’s “negation of [...] 
faith,” as Conrad puts it. But Rex and Wendy Stainton Rogers characterize 
their social constructionist position as “agnostic [... rather than] atheist [...] 
about the God-state of the real. We live,” they write, “in epistemic doubt”:
Sometimes it is assumed that to view children and childhoods as 
constructed is to claim that there is no material frame to a child 
(no body that can be hurt) [... but] social constructionism does not 
[...] imply an unthinking relativism in which “anything goes” [...] 
rather it is a way of thinking that argues that w]e have to strive 
to treat children benignly within a world of the practically real (that 
which passes for “real” in practice), while at the same time always 
being alert to the constructed character of that reality (Rogers & 
Rogers, 1998, pp. 183‒184).
Likewise Butler argues that:
To claim that gender is constructed is not to assert its illusoriness 
or artificiality, [... rather it is] to suggest that certain cultural 
configurations of gender take the place of “the real” and 
10 For a fuller discussion of this, see Lesnik-Oberstein, 1994.
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consolidate and augment their hegemony through [...] felicitous 
self-naturalization (Butler, 1990/2006, p. 45).
From this, it follows that to characterize attention to the cultural con-
struction of identity as nihilistic solipsism, or, in other words, to see it as 
negation, side-steps our implicatedness as participant observers in the con-
struction of reality.11
Irony, however, has been claimed as a potential remedy to this, and as 
a way of attempting to acknowledge one’s own implicatedness in language. 
Indeed, in “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway (1991) has argued for 
irony as a political strategy, which she sees not as a way of attacking femi-
nism, but as a way of opening it up to questioning whilst remaining within 
the fold. For her, “Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into 
larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible 
things together because both or all are necessary and true” (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 149), hence the discomposure experienced in the face of irony because 
of the way it questions stability in meaning is fundamentally and politically 
necessary. Ultimately Haraway positions irony as “faithful to feminism” in 
the way that “blasphemy is faithful,” rather than faithful after the manner 
of “reverent worship and identification” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). Haraway’s 
position is one which welcomes irony as dissent both on the grounds of 
its challenge and because it implicitly recognizes what it interrogates.
For Judith Butler irony can be found in the very structure of language 
and its use. She argues that words intended to wound, “words such as 
‘nigger’ and ‘spick’”, can be “decontextualiz[ed] and recontextualiz[ed] [...] 
through radical acts of [repetition and] misappropriation” and that this, 
constitutes the basis of an ironic hopefulness that the conventional 
relation between word and wound might become tenuous and even 
broken over time. Such words do wound, and yet [...] “racist 
structures are vulnerable.” I take this to apply to racist linguistic 
structures as well. (Butler, 1997, pp. 100‒101)
11 See Walsh, 2002.
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This idea is echoed by Denise Riley, who argues that “The word has the 
inbuilt capacity to interrogate itself, a latent capacity sparked into life by 
[...] repetition” (Riley, 2000, p. 156). As her figure for this idea, Riley uses 
Echo, the site of the passive repetition of Narcissus’s words. She also links 
Echo’s repetitions to irony, and claims that though the feminine 
Echo/irony “is unsparingly condemned to passivity [...] her very passivity 
possesses its own strong agency. [... For] Condemned like Echo herself to 
listen attentively, irony hears and takes note when the language around it, 
like the lady, doth protest too much” (Riley, 2000, p. 157). In other words, 
irony is understood here as a figure for a lack of fixity in language, and 
for Butler and Riley this is a reason for optimism because they see it as 
heralding the possibility of progressive change.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the notion of irony would seem to undermine any persist-
ing notion of language as simply representational, or of ideology as some-
thing a critic can detach herself from and diagnose in/for others. Likewise, 
the notion that any discourse purporting to give an account of the “real” 
world (such as “history” for example, or “science”) can be privileged as 
somehow outside of discursive production and so used as a bench-mark 
from which to judge the “correctness” of the work of literature is also 
problematized. For if, extrapolating from de Man, irony is the condition of 
language, the corollary is that “[t]here is no such thing as faithful and literal 
speech, which is at one with its world, and then ironic or distanced speech, 
which would speak with a sense of distance, quotation or otherness” 
(Colebrook, 2004, p. 129). Thus the so-called instance of “irony,” read 
closely, merely serves to underline that the constitutive structure of lan-
guage is not one that can be escaped through recourse to a position outside 
of language, through, for example, an appeal to “reality” or the (gendered) 
“body” since these too are themselves always already effects of discourse.
That irony is linked to ideas of self-reflexivity by both Haraway and Riley 
(Riley, 1988, p. 98) is also telling with respect to the unease of children’s 
literature critics in the face of the ironic, for the problems around the ques-
tion of irony result in a tendency (not limited to children’s literature criti-
cism) to produce thematic readings that implicitly mobilize a conception of 
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language as “reflecting” an assumed “reality.”12 Attention to irony, by con-
trast, “consists in dragging authority as such into a scene which it cannot 
master” (Felman, 1982, p. 8) by revealing language’s relationship to the 
supposed “real” to be always subject to perspective; it opens things up to 
question and leaves scope for holding two or more potentially incompatible 
ideas in play at the same time. Irony, not as a trope but as the condition 
of language, refuses the petrification of meaning.
12 For related discussions on this subject see Walsh, 2003.
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